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Abstract
The shift from hunting and gathering to agriculture, some 10,000 years ago, triggered the
rst demographic explosion in history. Along with population, working time increased, while
food consumption remained at the subsistence level. For that reason, most anthropologists
regard the adoption of agriculture as an economical puzzle.
I show, using a neoclassical economic model, that there is nothing puzzling about the
adoption of agriculture. Agriculture brings four technological changes: an increase in total
factor productivity, a stabilization of total factor productivity, less interference of children on
production, and the possibility of food storage. In my model, each of those changes induces free,
rational and self-interested hunter-gatherers to adopt agriculture. As a result, working time
increases while consumption remains at the subsistence level, and population begins to grow
until diminishing returns to labor bring it to a halt. Welfare, which depends on consumption,
leisure, and fertility, rises at rst; but after a few generations it falls below its initial level. Still,
the adoption of agriculture is irreversible. The latter generations choose to remain farmers
because, at their current levels of population, reverting to hunting and gathering would reduce
their welfare.
Key words: Paleoeconomics; economic anthropology; Neolithic Revolution; hunter-gatherers; agri-
culture; original a­ uent society.
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1 Introduction
The shift from hunting and gathering to agriculture, usually termed the Neolithic Revolution (10,000
to 5,000 B.P.), triggered the rst demographic explosion in the history of humankind (Bocquet-
Appel 2002). In the course of few centuries, typical communities grew from about 30 individuals
to 300 or more, and population densities increased from less than one hunter-gatherer per square
mile, to 20 or more farmers on the same surface (Johnson and Earle 2000, 43, 125, 246).
Population was not the only thing that expanded during the Neolithic Revolution. Working
time expanded as well. Ethnographical studies indicate that hunter-gatherers worked less that
six hours per day, whereas primitive horticulturists worked seven hours on average, and intensive
agriculturalists worked nine (Sackett 1996, 33842). The increase in working time was, however,
not accompanied by an increase in food consumption. If anything, food consumption fell a bit
(Armelagos et al. 1991; Cohen and Armelagos 1984), though certainly not much, as hunter-gatherers
were already chronically undernourished and constantly threatened by famine (Kaplan 2000). The
lost of leisure without an increase in food consumption has convinced most anthropologists that
the Neolithic Revolution reduced welfare. For that reason, they regard our ancestorsdecision to
farm as a puzzle in need of explanation.
I will show, using a neoclassical economic model, that there is nothing puzzling about the facts
of the Neolithic Revolution. In my model, rational and self-interested hunter-gatherers freely adopt
agriculture. The adoption of agriculture increases working time while consumption remains at the
subsistence level, and the initially stable population begins to grow until diminishing returns to
labor bring it to a halt. Welfare, which depends on consumption, leisure, and fertility, rises at rst;
but after few generations it falls below its initial level. Still, the shift from hunting and gathering to
agriculture is irreversible. The latter generations choose to remain farmers because, at their current
levels of population, reverting to hunting and gathering would reduce their welfare. Many hands
make hard work, but there is nothing the hands can do about it.
The adoption of agriculture brings four technological changes: an increase in total factor pro-
ductivity, a stabilization of total factor productivity, less interference of children on productive
activities, and the possibility of food storage. In my model, each technological change reproduces,
by itself, the facts of the Neolithic Revolution. Hence, not only are the facts of the Neolithic
Revolution not puzzling: from an economists perspective, they were inevitable.
Most models of the Neolithic Revolution assume that the total factor productivity of agriculture
is larger than that of hunting and gathering, at least when the revolution takes place (Weisdorf
2005). Since that assumption is common, I will not discuss it here. The other three technological
changes, on the other hand, have been (to my knowledge) disregarded by modelers, and thus merit
some attention.
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The instability of total factor productivity is probably the main problem of contemporary hunter-
gatherers (Kaplan 2000; Johnson and Earle 2000, 57). Their resources increase and decrease pe-
riodically (daily for hunters, yearly for gatherers), and every once in a while they fail altogether.
Domestication of plants and animals alleviates the problem, by smoothing (though not completely)
the yield of the land (Johnson and Earle 2000, 127).
Instability is further alleviated by the possibility of storing food. Most hunter-gatherers are
nomads, and carrying food around is too costly a burden for them. The alternative would be to
settle down; but as they quickly deplete local resources, the trade-o¤ is solved in favor of moving
(Sahlins 1998). Early farmers, on the contrary, led sedentary lives, and produced starchy crops
suitable for storing (Johnson and Earle 2000, 33).
Sedentism also reduces the cost of children, mainly because caring for them interferes with food
gathering tasks requiring a high degree of mobility (Kramer and Boone 2002).
Related literature
The theories of agriculture adoption have been extensively surveyed elsewhere (Weisdorf 2005).
Hence, I will limit the discussion to the two models that share with mine the inclusion of leisure in
the utility function; an essential feature, if one is to assess the welfare e¤ects of expanding working
time. Those models are Marceau and Myers(2006) and Weisdorfs (2004).
Marceau and Myers model the adoption of agriculture as a common resource problem. At low
levels of technology, the whole population forms a unique band of hunter-gatherers. The members of
this band coordinate to prevent the overexploitation of a common resource. As technology improves,
the prospect of leaving the band to be a farmer gets more and more attractive. When technology
surpasses a certain threshold, the lure of agriculture becomes irresistible and the band breaks apart
into a myriad of small communities of farmers. The farmers dont cooperate to preserve the common
resource and, as a result, consumption falls while working time increases.
I sustain Marceau and Myersmodel fails to provide a good account of the Neolithic Revolution,
for two reasons. First, the model predicts that farmers will live in smaller groups than hunter-
gatherers, while the opposite is true. Second, the model builds on the unsound assumption that
hunter-gatherers coordinate to prevent overexploitation, whereas farmers do not. There is mounting
evidence that contemporary hunter-gatherers use individually optimal foraging strategies. They
are perfectly willing to exhaust their resources, and when they fail to do so, it is due to their low
population densities and ine¢ cient technologies (Penn 2003). Farmers, on the other hand, organize
themselves hierarchically, and their leaders often take measures that mitigate the tragedy of the
commons. For example, they may regulate the fallow cycle to maximize the yield of the land, or
manage the use of pastures to prevent overgrazing (Johnson and Earle 2000, 271, 299, 310, 311,
318, 327, 328, 388).
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InWeisdorfs model, early farmers give away leisure in exchange for other goods produced by an
emerging class of non-food specialists (e.g., craftsmen, chiefs, bureaucrats, and priests). Weisdorfs
hypothesis is compelling because non-food specialists were needed to develop the innovations that
followed agriculture (e.g., writing, metallurgy), and that characterize civilization. Although I will
show that the demand for non-food specialists is not necessary to explain agriculture, the relevance
of Weisdorfs explanation relative to my neoclassical account will have to be settled on empirical
grounds.
Marceau and Myers, and also Weisdorf, assume population is constant during the transition
to agriculture. That is a serious limitation, as the possibility of raising more children probably
played a crucial role in our ancestorsdecision to become farmers. The population explosion that
took place during the Neolithic Revolution clearly points in that direction. My model addresses the
issue by assuming reproduction to be a personal decision. A realistic assumption, as it is known
that contemporary hunter-gatherers do control population, using such mechanisms as abortion,
infanticide, prolonged lactation, and postpartum sex taboos (Cashdan 1985).
Finally, my model is also linked to the family of endogenous fertility models, pioneered by Razin
and Ben-Zion (1975). In particular, it is closely related to those models in which the diminishing
returns to labor operate as a Malthusian population check; for example, Boldrin and Jones (2002),
Eckstein et al. (1988), and Nerlove et al. (1986).
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2 A model of agriculture adoption
2.1 Model setup
Time is divided in t = 1; 2; 3; : : : periods. Each period has two seasons, indexed by j 2 f1; 2g.
During period t, a tribe has Nt > 0 identical adult members or tribesmen. Their lives last exactly
one period. Generations do not overlap.
At the beginning of the rst season, each tribesman decides how many children to have. Denote
by nt > 0 the number of children of a typical tribesman. In the next period, the size of the tribe
will thus be Nt+1 = ntNt.
To survive, a tribesman must eat at least c > 0 units of food during each season. Denote by
ctj  c his food consumption during season j. He must also provide c units of food per season to
each of his children.
Tribesmen work to earn their food. Let wtj  0 be a typical tribesmans working time during
season j. He will produce Atjwtj units of food during that season; Atj > 0 being the typical
tribesmans productivity, which he takes as given. A part of production will be lost due to children
interference:  units of food per child, where  is high if the tribe is nomadic, and low if it is
sedentary.
If the tribe is sedentary, a tribesman may store some food at the end of season one, for future
consumption during season two. Denote by st  0 a tribesmans food savings, and let  = N if the
tribe is nomadic and  = S if it is sedentary. The tribesman is subject to the following food budget
constraints:
At1wt1   nt = ct1 + cnt + st;
At2wt2   nt| {z }
Income
= ct2 + cnt| {z }
Expenses
  st1S ()| {z }
Savings
;
where 1S () is an indicator function that takes value 1 when  = S, and otherwise takes value 0.
Eating food and having children make a tribesman happy, whereas work makes him unhappy.
The utility function of a period t tribesman is given by
u (ct1; ct2; wt1; wt2; nt) = v (ct1) + v (ct2)  
+ 1
w1+t1  

+ 1
w1+t2 + nt:
Parameter  > 0 implies that children are valued, whereas  > 0 implies tribesmen dislike
work. Parameter  > 0 indicates that, everything else being equal, a tribesman will want to spread
his workload evenly between the two seasons. The utility of consumption is strictly increasing
and concave: v0 > 0 and v00 < 0. Function u is an instance of Beckers (1992) Malthusian utility
function, which doesnt include the quality of children as an argument. As Becker points out, before
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the Industrial Revolution there were virtually no opportunities to invest on the quality of children;
medical care, education, and training were just too rudimentary. Hence, for our purposes, omitting
the quality of children from the tribesman utility function is harmless.
The tribe chooses between two production technologies: hunting and gathering, and agriculture.
In order to draw a clear before and afterpicture of agriculture adoption, assume all members of
the tribe must use the same technology. Which of the two alternatives, they must agree by vote.
The equality of all tribesmen entails the election of technology will always be unanimous.
The e¢ ciency of hunting and gathering declines the more people engage on it (Johnson and
Earle 2000, 54). Everyday, the tribesmen must venture a little farther from camp in order to obtain
food. Eventually, the value of the remaining food falls short of the costs of obtaining it, plus the
opportunity cost of lifting the camp and moving somewhere else. A large tribe of hunter-gatherers
consumes the cheaperfood sources near camp faster than a smaller tribe, and also has to incur
in the costs of relocating more often. In that spirit, dene the productivity of a hunter-gatherer
during season j as follows:
Atj = aj (Ntwtj)
 
; (1)
where aj > 0 is season j total factor productivity, and 0 <  < 1. This condition guarantees that to-
tal production increases when the tribes total work e¤ort increases (i.e. NtwtjAtj = aj (Ntwtj)
1 
is increasing in Ntwtj).
Just as hunting and gathering, agriculture is subject to diminishing returns. Early farmers were
mostly slash-and-burners. When population increased, they were forced to speed up the fallow cycle,
reducing the productivity of land (Boserup 1965). Therefore, we will also model the productivity
of farmers using the formulation in (1), changing the values of a1 and a2.
For future use, dene average working time ( w), average total factor productivity (), and the
instability of total factor productivity (), as follows:
w =
wt1 + wt2
2
;
 =
a1 + a2
2
;
 =
a1   a22
 :
Table 1 (page 15) summarizes the notation.
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2.2 The tribesman problem
Before solving the tribesman problem, two assumptions are in order. First, assume a1 > a2, so
an abundant season precedes a scarce season. As a result, At1 will always be larger than At2 in
equilibrium, and tribesmen will want to store some food at the end of season one, even if storing
turns out to be impossible (we will conrm that At1 > At2 in Section 2.3). Second, assume

c+ 
>
(
1 +

a1
a2
 1+
1 
)
v0 (c) ; (2)
which implies that a tribesman will use any income over c to have children. Before the Industrial
Revolution, any raise in income induced an increase in population, while consumption remained close
to the subsistence level. Inequality 2 guarantees the model will produce a reasonable approximation
to the dynamics of consumption before the Industrial Revolution, while letting us focus our attention
on the interaction between work and fertility. The inequality will hold if children are cheap enough
(c+  is su¢ ciently low).
A tribesman solves
max
fc1;c2;w1;w2;n;sg
u = v (c1) + v (c2)  +1w+11   +1w+12 + n;
s.t. A1w1 = c1 + (c+ )n+ s;
A2w2 = c2 + (c+ )n  s1S () ;
c1; c2  c;
w1; w2; n; s  0;
where the t subscripts have been dropped to simplify the expressions. Table 2 (page 16) displays
the solution to the tribesman problem, for the cases without and with storage (i.e. for  = N and
 = S).
2.3 Short-run equilibrium
In the short-run, population is xed at N (the empty dot indicates the short-run value of a
variable). Equilibrium requires labor productivity to satisfy equation (1). Using that equation,
together with the tribesman optimal choices (table 2), we can solve for the short-run equilibrium
values of all variables. Table 3 (page 17) displays the short-round results, for the cases without and
with storage.
Inspecting table 2, and recalling that a1 > a2 and 0 <  < 1, we conrm that labor productivity
is always larger during the abundant season (A1 > A

2). Also, when storing is unfeasible, the
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tribesmen work more during the scarce season (w1 < w

2), while if storing is feasible, they work
more during the abundant season (w1 > w

2).
2.4 Long-run equilibrium
In the long-run, diminishing returns to labor operate as a Malthusian check. As population grows,
labor productivity declines, until the optimal tribesmans choice is to bear exactly one child: n = 1
(the full dot indicates the long-run value of a variable). From then onwards, population will remain
constant.
Imposing the one child condition on the short-run results (table 3), we can compute the long-run
equilibrium values of all variables. Table 4 (page 18) displays the long-run results, for the cases
without and with storage.
Proposition 1 (Stability of the long-run equilibrium.) The long-run equilibrium is stable,
meaning that a small deviation from the equilibrium population level (N) will always be reversed.
2.5 The adoption of agriculture
Consider a tribe of hunter-gatherers that has reached the long-run equilibrium: each tribesman
bears one child (n = 1) and population is at its long-run equilibrium level (N = N). One good
day, the tribe stumbles upon a new technology: agriculture. Suppose the tribe decides to adopt
this new technology (later we will prove that was the rational decision). Agriculture brings four
technological changes: an increase in average total factor productivity (4+), a stabilization of total
factor productivity (4 ), less interference of children on production (4 ), and the possibility of
food storage (a change from  = N to  = S).
Proposition 2 (Short-run e¤ects of agriculture.) Each technological change of agriculture pro-
duces a short-run increase in fertility (4+n), average working time (4+ w), and utility (4+u).
In sum:
@n
@
> 0;
@ w
@
> 0;
@u
@
> 0;
@n
@
< 0;
@ w
@
< 0;
@u
@
< 0;
@n
@
< 0;
@ w
@
< 0;
@u
@
< 0;
n[N] < n[S] ; w[N] < w[S] ; u[N] < u[S] :
The generation that adopts agriculture suddenly nds children to be more a¤ordable: feeding
one child requires less work when productivity is higher (4+; 4 ); a more stable productivity
(4 ) implies the required work will be a bit more tiring during the abundant season, but much
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less strenuous during the scarce one; the possibility of storing food ( = S) allows tribesmen to use
rst season abundance to provide for the times of scarcity. As one would expect, cheaper children
translate into increased fertility (4+n). The e¤ect of cheaper children on working time, on the
other hand, is not as clear cut. Each tribesman could work less hours and still a¤ord more than one
children. In our case, the substitution of children for leisure dominates the income e¤ect, so working
time increases (4+ w). Finally, as working time increases, labor productivity falls, reducing the
e¢ ciency gains of agriculture. The loss in e¢ ciency attenuates the surge in fertility and work, but
does not change the direction of the e¤ects.
From proposition 2 we learn that the generation that adopts agriculture is be happy with the
changes. In other words, a tribe of selsh, utility-maximizing people will freely abandon hunting
and gathering to become farmers. Working time will expand, but the additional toil will be more
than compensated by the larger families the tribesmen will be able to a¤ord.
As a consequence of increased fertility, population will start to grow. Eventually, it will stabilize
at a new equilibrium with higher population.
Proposition 3 (Long-run e¤ects of agriculture.) In the long-run, fertility converges to n =
1. The four changes of agriculture produce a long-run increase in population (4+N). Working
time will be longer (4+ w) as a result of the increase in average total factor productivity (4+),
the stabilization of total factor productivity (4 ), and the reduction of the interference of children
on production (4 ). The possibility of food storage ( = S) has an ambiguous e¤ect on working
time, which may increase or decrease. Only a reduction of the interference of children on production
will have a long-run e¤ect on utility, which will fall below its pre-agriculture level (4 u). In sum:
@N
@
> 0;
@ w
@
> 0;
@u
@
= 0;
@N
@
< 0;
@ w
@
< 0;
@u
@
= 0;
@N
@
< 0;
@ w
@
< 0;
@u
@
> 0;
N[N] < N[S] ; w[N] ? w[S] ; u[N] = u[S] :
Proposition 3 tells us that the descendants from the original farmers will be worse o¤ than
their hunter-gatherer ancestors. In spite of that, the transition to agriculture is irreversible. From
proposition 2 we infer that, once the new long-run equilibrium has been reached, reverting to
hunting and gathering will reduce the utility of the current generation. Hence, they will choose to
remain farmers.
Proposition 4 (Long-run e¤ect of food storage on working time.) In the long-run, the pos-
sibility of food storage ( = S) will increase working time (4+ w) if 2 +  > 1:
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In other words, if the returns to labor fall quickly enough ( is high), or if the tribesmen are
su¢ ciently averse to workload instability ( is high), then the possibility of food storage will end up
increasing working time. When storage is feasible,  1 is the uncompensated labor supply elasticity.
The overwhelming majority of estimations locate that elasticity between 0 and 1 (Blundell and
MaCurdy 1999). Hence, reasonable values of  should be larger than 1. That dispels the ambiguity
from proposition 4. If food storage becomes possible, working time will eventually increase (4+ w).
In the long-run, all tribesmen eat the minimum amount and can only a¤ord to have one child.
But in the long-run the tribe is larger and, everything else being equal, that means labor productivity
is lower than before. As a result, each tribesmen must work more than his ancestors just to feed
himself and his child... unless the tribesman has the chance to store some food. Storing allows
the tribesman to substitute a large amount of e¤ort in the scarce season by a smaller amount in
the abundant season, when he is more e¢ cient. But even with storage things can get nasty if the
returns to labor fall too fast ( is high): all the additional work during the abundant season could
reduce the yield of the land so much that everybody ends up working more than before the adoption
of agriculture. Also, if the tribesmen are too inclined to smooth their labor supply through time (
is high), they will refuse to work much harder during the abundant season than during the scarce
season. If that is the case, working time will increase even if storage is feasible.
In sum, each of the four technological changes is enough to explain the consequences of shift-
ing from hunting and gathering to agriculture: the increased population and working time, while
consumption remains at subsistence level. Thus, from an economists perspective, not only do the
facts of the Neolithic Revolution make perfect sense: they were inevitable.
Figure 1 (page 19) illustrates the result of the four changes of agriculture happening together.
The gure summarizes 20 periods in the (simulated) history of a tribe. During the rst ten periods,
the tribesmen make a living out of hunting and gathering. Population stays at its long-run equi-
librium level; working time and utility are also constant. At the beginning of period 11, the tribe
discovers agriculture. Population increases at rst, but after a few generations it stabilizes at a
new, higher equilibrium. Working time and utility both soar in period 11. After that, they decline
over time. Working time stabilizes above its pre-agriculture level; the utility of the last generations
falls below the utility of their hunter-gatherer ancestors. All the while, consumption remains at the
subsistence level. Yet the tribesmen of periods 12 and after will not revert to hunting and gathering,
as gure 1B evidences. The shadowutility of hunting and gathering runs beneath the utility of
agriculture. Things get bad for farmers, but their alternative gets even worse.
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3 Concluding remarks
What needs explanation is why in contemporary contexts hunter-gatherers often
demonstrate unlimited, rather than limited, material wants. Why is it that at Momega
and, according to the literature, elsewhere modern hunter-gatherers have apparently
insatiable demands for shotguns, ries, motor vehicles, cassette recorders, CD players,
televisions, and VCRs?Jon Altman (1992)
Economics studies how people allocate scarce means to their unlimited wants. As essential
as the principle of scarcity is to the economists way of thinking, it is strongly rejected by other
social scientists. Émile Durkheim, a founding father of both sociology and anthropology, believed
people learn from their social world what and how much to desire (1953, 95). To Durkheim, the
unlimitedness of wants is not part of human nature, but a product of modern Western society: an
evil product that fuels the war of all against all (Durkheim 1961, 45; 1969). Max Weber, the famous
sociologist and political economist,also deemed unlimited wants extrinsic, a capitalistic creation.
He provided as evidence the behavior of traditional peasants. According to Weber, peasants do not
crave for more and more, but are content to live the way they are accustomed. As soon as they
satisfy their very limited wants, they stop working. It follows, Weber reasons, that an employer
who wants to extract more e¤ort from peasants should lower their wages instead of raising them
(Weber 1958, 5962). Although Webers characterization of peasant mentality has been debunked
countless times (see, for example, James Scott 1985), many of those who reject his evidence as false
still embrace his ideas about the cultural origin of our greediness.
When in the 1960s it was established that hunter-gathererswork very little compared to modern
standards, anthropologists thought they had found indisputable proof for Durkheim and Webers
most radical ideas. Professor Emeritus Marshall Sahlins, the dominant voice of contemporary
economic anthropology, declared hunter-gatherers the original a­ uent society.They are a­ uent,
he argued, not because their means are abundant, but because their wants are few. If the behavior
of hunter-gatherers obeys any laws at all, it is the laws of Zen economics (Sahlins 1968, 1998). The
principles of neoclassical economics, and in particular the idea of unlimited wants, are nothing but
the origin myth of capitalist society.Economic theory, Sahlins denounced, is merely the rhetoric
used by capitalism to justify and perpetuate itself (Sahlins 1976, 53, 205207).
The a­ uence of hunter-gatherers turns the adoption of agriculture into a conundrum (if a parent,
forced to kill the children he cant feed, can be seriously called a­ uent). As Hardy (1992) famously
put it: Why farm? Why give up the 20-hour work week and the fun of hunting in order to toil
in the sun? The decision of our ancestors supplied non-economists with ammunition to attack
another favorite of economic principles: rationality.
In these pages I have argued that, if read properly, the facts of the Neolithic Revolution bear
no evidence against the principles of unlimited wants and rationality. At least from that trench,
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nothing emerges that obliges us to delete the word max from our microeconomic textbooks, or
demote nonsatiation from its rank of axiom. Neoclassical economics is perfectly able to explain
the behavior of hunter-gatherers: why they work so few hours, why given the chance they become
farmers, and why, when exposed to modern life, they demand DVD players, televisions, and iPods.
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A Appendix
A.1 Preliminary results
Three functions that will be useful later:
Kp (x1; x2) =
xp1 + x
p
2
xp 11   xp 12
;
Lp (x1; x2) =
xp1 + x
p
2
xp 11 + x
p 1
2
; (Lehmer mean)
Mp (x1; x2) =

1
2
xp1 +
1
2
xp2
 1
p
. (Generalized mean)
Lemma 5 If p < q and x1 > x2, then Kp (x1; x2) > Kq (x1; x2) :
Proof. From x1 > x2, it follows that
@Kp (x1; x2)
@p
=   (lnx1   lnx2) x
p
1x
p 1
2 + x
p 1
1 x
p
2h
xp 11   xp 12
i2 < 0:
Lemma 6 (Lehmer mean inequality) If p < q and x1 6= x2, then Lp (x1; x2) < Lq (x1; x2) :
Lemma 7 (Generalized mean inequality) If p < q and x1 6= x2, thenMp (x1; x2) < Mq (x1; x2) :
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A.2 Proof of proposition 1
For the dynamic system Nt+1 = ntNt to be stable, the following condition is su¢ cient:
 2 < N @n

@N

N=N
< 0: (3)
Condition 3 guarantees that if Nt is close to N, then Nt+1 will be even closer.
A.2.1 Case 1: Storage is unfeasible
If storage is unfeasible, we have that
N
@n
@N
=   (+ 1)
 + 
(N) 
(+1)
+
"
(=)
1 
(c+ )
+1
# 1
+ 
a
  +11 
1 + a
  +11 
2
  1 +
:
Plugging N into the previous expression we get
N
@n
@N

N=N
=   (+ 1)
 + | {z }
1

2  
c+ 

| {z }
2
:
From 0 <  < 1 and  > 1, it follows that 0 < 1 < 1. From c;  > 0, it follows that 0 < 2 < 2.
As a result,  2 < (N@n=@N)jN=N < 0.
A.2.2 Case 2: Storage is feasible
If storage is feasible, we have that
N
@n
@N
=   (+ 1)
 + 
(N) 
(+1)
+
"
(=)
1 
(c+ )
+1
# 1
+ ha1
2
i +1
+
+
ha2
2
i +1
+

:
Plugging N into the previous expression we get
N
@n
@N

N=N
=   (+ 1)
 + 

2  
c+ 

:
So again  2 < N (@n=@N)jN=N < 0. 
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A.3 Proof of proposition 2
The following proofs build on the short-run equilibrium results of table 3. Recall that a1 > a2 > 0,
0 <  < 1, and ; ; ; c; ;N > 0.
 @n=@ > 0.
Proof.
@n
@
=
+ 1
 + 
8><>: (=)
1 h
(N) (c+ )
i+1
9>=>;
1
+ 
a
  +11 
1 + a
  +11 
2
  +1+ 
a
  +1
1  1
1 + a
  +11  1
2

> 0:

 @n=@ < 0.
Proof.
@n
@
=
+ 1
 + 
8><>: (=)
1 h
(N) (c+ )
i+1
9>=>;
1
+ 
a
  +11 
1 + a
  +11 
2
  +1+ 
a
  +1
1  1
1   a
  +11  1
2

| {z }

:
The sign of @n=@ depends on  . Since a1 > a2, term  is negative. Hence, @n=@ < 0. 
 @n=@ < 0.
Proof.
@n
@
=  + 1
 + 
(c+ )
  +1+ 1
"
(=)
1 
(N)(+1)
# 1
+ 
a
  +11 
1 + a
  +11 
2

< 0:

 n[N] < n[S].
Proof.
n[S]  n[N] =
8><>: (=)
1 h
(N) (c+ )
i+1
9>=>;
1
+
2 
1 
+

M  11 

a+11 ; a
+1
2
 1
+  M 1
+

a+11 ; a
+1
2
 1
+

| {z }

:
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The sign of n[S]  n[N] depends on  , which will be positive if
M  11 

a+11 ; a
+1
2

< M 1
+

a+11 ; a
+1
2

:
But
  1
1   <
1
 + 
:
Thus, from the generalized mean inequality, we conclude  > 0, so n[N] < n[S]. 
 @ w=@ > 0.
Proof. Instead of @ w=@, consider @ ln w=@, which has the same sign as @ w=@.
@ ln w
@
=
1
1  

+ 1
 + 
L  +11  (a1; a2)
 1   L  11  (a1; a2)
 1

| {z }

:
The sign of @ ln w=@ depends on  . But
+ 1
 + 
> 1;
L  +11  (a1; a2) > 0;
L  11  (a1; a2) > 0:
Therefore,
 > L  +11  (a1; a2)
 1   L  11  (a1; a2)
 1
:
On the other hand,
 + 1
1   <  
1
1   :
Thus, from the Lehmer mean inequality it follows that
L  +11  (a1; a2) < L  11  (a1; a2) ;
or equivalently
L  +11  (a1; a2)
 1   L  11  (a1; a2)
 1
> 0:
That implies  > 0, so @ ln w=@ > 0 and @ w=@ > 0. 
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 @ w=@ < 0:
Proof. Instead of @ w=@, consider @ ln w=@, which has the same sign as @ w=@.
@ ln w
@
=
1
1  

+ 1
 + 
K  +11  (a1; a2)
 1  K  11  (a1; a2)
 1

| {z }

:
The sign of @ ln w=@ depends on  . But
+ 1
 + 
> 1;
K  +11  (a1; a2) < 0;
K  11  (a1; a2) < 0:
Therefore,
 < K  +11  (a1; a2)
 1  K  11  (a1; a2)
 1
:
On the other hand,
 + 1
1   <  
1
1   :
Thus, from lemma 5 it follows that
K  +11  (a1; a2) > K  11  (a1; a2) ;
or equivalently
K  +11  (a1; a2)
 1  K  11  (a1; a2)
 1
< 0:
That implies  < 0, so @ ln w=@ < 0 and @ w=@ < 0. 
 @ w=@ < 0:
Proof.
@ w
@
=   1
 + 
(c+ )
  1+ 1
(
=
(N)

a
  +11 
1 + a
  +11 
2
 1) 1+ 
a
  11 
1 + a
  11 
2

< 0:

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 w[N] < w[S].
Proof.
w[S]  w[N] =
(
=
2 (N) (c+ )
) 1
+

M 1
+
(a1; a2)
1
+  M  +11  (a1; a2)
1
+
M1

a
 1=(1 )
1 ;a
 1=(1 )
2

M+1

a
 1=(1 )
1 ;a
 1=(1 )
2
| {z }

:
The sign of w[S]  w[N] depends on  . But
1
 + 
>  + 1
1   ;
and thus, from the generalized mean inequality,
M 1
+
(a1; a2)
1
+ > M  +11  (a1; a2)
1
+ > 0:
Also, 1 < + 1. So again, from the generalized mean inequality,
0 <
M1

a
 1=(1 )
1 ; a
 1=(1 )
2

M+1

a
 1=(1 )
1 ; a
 1=(1 )
2
 < 1:
Therefore,  > 0, and that implies w[S]  w[N] > 0. 
 @u=@ > 0.
Proof.
@u
@
=

 + 
"
=
(N) (c+ )
# +1
+ 
a
  +11 
1 + a
  +11 
2
  +1+ 
a
  +11  1
1 + a
  +11  1
2

> 0:

 @u=@ < 0.
Proof.
@u
@
=

+ 1
"
=
(N) (c+ )
# +1
+ 
a
  +11 
1 + a
  +11 
2
  1 + 
a
  +11  1
1   a
  +11  1
2

| {z }

< 0:
The sign of @u=@ depends on  . Since a1 > a2, term  is negative. Hence, @u=@ < 0. 
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 @u=@ < 0.
Proof.
@u
@
=   
 + 
(c+ )
  +1+ 1
"
=
(N)
# +1
+ 
a
  +11 
1 + a
  +11 
2
  1 +
< 0:

 In the short run u[N] < u[S].
Proof.
u[S]  u[N] = 
1 + 
"
=
(N) (c+ )
# 
+
(n [S]  n [N]) :
But n[N] < n[S], and thus, u[N] < u[S]. 
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A.4 Proof of proposition 3
The following proofs build on the long-run equilibrium results of table 4. Recall that a1 > a2 > 0,
0 <  < 1, and ; ; ; c;  > 0:
 @N=@ > 0.
Proof.
@N
@
=
1

(
1
(2c+ )
+

=
c+ 
1 ) 1(+1)

a
  +11 
1 + a
  +11 
2
  +1
(+1)

a
  +11  1
1 + a
  +11  1
2

> 0:

 @N=@ < 0.
Proof.
@N
@
=
1

(
1
(2c+ )
+

=
c+ 
1 ) 1(+1) 
a
  +11 
1 + a
  +11 
2
  +1
(+1)

a
  +11  1
1   a
  +11  1
2

| {z }
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The sign of @N=@ depends on  . Since a1 > a2, term  is negative. Hence, @N=@ < 0. 
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The sign of N[S] N[N] depends on  , and  will be positive if
M  +11  (a1; a2) < M +1+ (a1; a2) :
But
 + 1
1   <
+ 1
 + 
:
Thus, from the generalized mean inequality, we conclude  > 0, so N[N] < N[S].
 @ w=@ > 0
Proof. Instead of @ w=@, consider @ ln w=@, which has the same sign as @ w=@.
@ ln w
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1
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:
The sign of @ ln w=@ depends on  . But
 + 1
1   <  
1
1   :
Thus, from the Lehmer mean inequality it follows that
L  +11  (a1; a2) < L  11  (a1; a2) ;
or equivalently
L  +11  (a1; a2)
 1   L  11  (a1; a2)
 1
> 0:
That implies  > 0, so @ ln w=@ > 0 and @ w=@ > 0. 
 @ w=@ > 0
Proof. Instead of @ w=@, consider @ ln w=@, which has the same sign as @ w=@.
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The sign of @ ln w=@ depends on  . But
 + 1
1   <  
1
1   :
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Thus, from lemma 5 it follows that
K  +11  (a1; a2) > K  11  (a1; a2) ;
or equivalently
K  +11  (a1; a2)
 1  K  11  (a1; a2)
 1
< 0:
That implies  < 0, so @ ln w=@ < 0 and @ w=@ < 0. 
 @ w=@ > 0
Proof.
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 @u=@ > 0
Proof.
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A.5 Proof of proposition 4
w[S] > w[N] if and only if
 w (; )  1
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Function  w is continuous in  > 0 and 0 <  < 1. Also, provided that a1 > a2 > 0, it is
straightforward that  w takes value 0 if and only if + 2 = 1.
From continuity it follows that  w will have the same sign for all  and  in the set
A+  f(; ) :  > 0, 0 <  < 1, and + 2 > 1g :
One point in set A+ is (1; 1=2). Evaluating  w at that point we get.
 w (1; 1=2) =
1
2

(2c+ )=
c+ 
 1
2 
H2=3 (a1; a2) H2 (a1; a2)
	| {z }

;
where
Hp (a1; a2) =
ap1 + a
p
2
a2p1 + a
2p
2
1=2 :
But, for all p > 0 and a1 6= a2,
@Hp (a1; a2)
@p
=  ap1ap2 (ln a1   ln a2)
ap1   ap2
a2p1 + a
2p
2
3=2 < 0:
Hence H2=3 (a1; a2) > H2 (a1; a2), term  > 0, function  w (1; 1=2) > 0, and nally  w (; )  0
for all (; ) 2 A+.
The proof that  w (; )  0 for all (; ) 2 A   f(; ) :  > 0, 0 <  < 1, and + 2 < 1g
is analogous, so I omit it. 
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